of 1996. Kamajo militia units never observed any cease-fire, and key RUF/ SL bases-including Sankoh's Gola Forest headquarters-were overrun during negotiations. Sankoh and Kabbah signed the peace agreement on 30 November 1996.
Under-age combatants from the government side began demobilisation in 1993-94, but demobilisation of the RUF/SL and the Kamajo militia was still pending when the peace agreement was signed. Surviving RUF/SL units went to ground in the forest. Kamajo militia operations continued. In February 1997 Sankoh, visiting Nigeria, apparently to buy arms, was detained by the Nigerian authorities.
On 25 
UNDER-AGE COMBATANTS AS VICTIMS AND AGENTS
The war began in 1991 with no more than a handful of insurgents ranged against small government forces. Today, estimates of the total number of combatants in Sierra Leone, including the Kamajo militia, range from 50,000 to 75,000-a fifteenfold increase. It has been estimated that perhaps half of all combatants in the RUF/SL are in the age range 8-14 years. There are also significant numbers of under-18 combatants in army irregular units and the Kamajo militia. Both RSLMF and RUF/SL have deployed under-age female combatants (interviews 2 and 3 below).
Male and female under-age irregulars are rated highly by their officers. Under-age irregulars fight without inhibitions (interview 5) and kill without compunction, sometimes casually (interview 4), sometimes as an extension of play. They are good in ambush situations, one of the main combat tactics (interview 2), and-separated by war from their kin-are fiercely loyal to their bra (Krio, lit. 'big brother'), i.e. the officer responsible for recruiting and training them (interviews 1, 4 and 6).
Interviewees report smoking marijuana, being prepared for battle with injections of amphetamines, taking crack cocaine or a cocktail of local substances including gunpowder (interviews 2 and 4). Atrocities are undoubtedly committed under the influence of drugs. Girl combatants regularly experience military rape (interviews 2 and 3; cf. Littlewood, 1997), sometimes as a 'punishment' for losing ground (interview 2). Large numbers of children have been conscripted against their will, mainly by the RUF/SL (interviews 6, 7 and 8). In all these respects a majority of participants in the Sierra Leone war can be considered 'victims' of military manipulation.
But many under-age combatants joined up voluntarily (interviews 1-5), some looking for revenge (interviews 1 and 3), others to survive. Youngsters in a war zone find themselves 'on the street' (interviews 3, 4 and 6). Joining a militia group is both meal ticket and substitute education (interviews 1, 3, 4 and 6). The pay may be derisory (interview 1), but weapon training pays quicker dividends than school ever did; soon the AK47 brings food, money, a warm bath and instant adult respect (interview 4). The combat group substitutes for lost family and friends (interviews 1, 2 and 6).
Time and again interviewees return to the theme of educational aspirations. Economic failure, political corruption and structural adjustment wreaked havoc on educational systems in Sierra Leone. Formal education has not been effective in preparing young people for the economic realities of modern life (Mokuwa, 1997) , and both RSLMF and RUF/SL recruited extensively from the swollen ranks of educational drop-outs hustling for a living in border logging and mining camps (Richards, 1996 ; cf. Reno, 1995; Zack-Williams, 1995 ). Yet loss of educational opportunity is seen as a major factor in the decision to fight (see especially interviews 1, 4 and 5).
The accounts repeatedly stress that it makes little sense to stand down voluntarily without any real promise of social reintegration, education or training, or civilian job prospects, and that failure to address this complex of aspirations caused and now prolongs the conflict. Frustrated by the failure of demobilisation to offer a way out (interview 5), several informants promptly re-enlisted (cf. interview 1) after the military coup of 25 May 1997.
Political understanding of the war is a striking feature of some of the comment. Informants rejected the idea that the conflict is barbarously purposeless (Kaplan, 1994) or the result of ethnic and religious tensions, preferring to interpret it primarily in terms of an intergenerational struggle for a fairer society (interviews 1, 5 and 7).
The single most remarkable commentary is from an articulate Kamajo militia fighter. Blaming the RUF/SL for the loss of his home and educational prospects, he nevertheless unerringly puts his finger on the failures of patrimonial politics as the cause of the anger of the young cadres of the RUF/ SL (interview 5). From the notes they scatter in attacked villages he concludes that they are, like him, frustrated students. Patrimonial politics sent a few to study to the highest level overseas and denied that opportunity to a majority, not on merit but on grounds of political favouritism.
The capacity of the young combatants opposed to the RUF/SL to understand what their enemies are fighting for stands in stark contrast to the incomprehension of observers, to whom the AFRC/RUF alliance between military enemies after the May coup came as a complete surprise (Hecht, 1997) . Those who posit a stark contrast between the merits of democracy and the evils of militarism in Sierra Leone would do well to heed the experience and opinions of these politically informed fighters not yet old enough to vote.
SOURCES
The material below derives mainly from interviewing under-age excombatants undergoing rehabilitation in two programmes in Freetown in 1996 (the Children Associated with the War [CAW] programme based at the Wellington Approved School and the army demobilisation camp at Grafton). Additional interviews were obtained 'up country' with recently selfdemobilised RUF/SL conscripts.
Our aim has been to build up a 'bank' of interview material as an input to community and agency discussions about options for the demobilisation and rehabilitation of children and young people affected by war. We have drawn inspiration from a collection of 'street children's' accounts of life in Freetown published by the People's Education Association (1989).
So far we have collected twenty-two accounts, but there is space below only to sample the material. Rather than paste together bits and pieces to illustrate an agenda of our own, it seemed better to present a smaller number of interviews in extenso, to give a sense of who these young people are and where they are coming from.
We have chosen a mixture of accounts representing all the major groups of under-age combatants in the war-RSLMF-linked irregular units, the RUF/ SL and the Kamajo militia. For context we append two interviews with abductees who escaped from the RUF/SL. One of these interviews is with an unschooled middle-aged farmer rejected for guerrilla training. Since the RUF/SL depended on written messages to convey orders, young people with elementary schooling were its main target. But it seems also that the movement expected only the partially schooled fully to understand and respond to its political analysis.
Four interviews were carried out by Krijn Peters, three in English and one in a mixture of English, Krio and Mende with the assistance of a translator. Peters worked on a regular basis with informants in demobilisation camps for five months to establish rapport for interviewing. The other five interviews were carried out in the national lingua franca, Krio, by Paul Richards. Two of these interviews were carried out within a framework of co-operation established with the CAW project for Peters's study. The others were 'one-off' contacts but in communities where Richards has on-going anthropological fieldwork commitments.
Originally it was planned to contact interviewees to review transcribed material and discuss a final version for publication. Much of the material was given in the explicit hope that it would appear in print with the contributor's name credited. We had to review this possibility after the coup of 25 May 1997. Many under-age combatants were remobilised by the Armed Forces Ruling Council/Revolutionary United Front alliance and the Kamajo militia. Accordingly, steps have been taken to protect the identity of all interviewees, for the time being at least, by deleting personal names and some place-name references.
1 Male youth ex-combatant, RSLMF-linked irregular This account may be considered typical of the experience of many male under-age RSLMF-linked irregulars. The young man comes from a rural family in Kailahun, and was 18 years old when interviewed in October 1996 but had begun to fight in 1991, about age 13. His family had been scattered by the RUF invasion, a younger brother killed, and his education halted. He fought for about four years, responding to a demobilisation offer only when there was a cease-fire with the RUF. He is frank that revenge was one of his reasons for fighting.
The account is especially interesting in that the interviewee was recruited by Captain Ben-Hirsch, one of the first RSLMF officers in the war zone to respond to RUF tactics by creating his own force of under-age irregulars. Ben-Hirsch was allegedly one of the architects of the NPRC takeover in 1992, though ambushed and killed (the interviewee was an eyewitness) before the coup took place. It is interesting to note Ben-Hirsch adapting indigenous ideas, associated with the men's 'secret society' Poro, about hindo-hindo (the mobilisation of village young men for community defence).
The What kind of occupation did your father and uncle have? My father, he was a farmer. At that age I liked farming. By then I wanted to become a farmer ... Not any more. My uncle, he was a medical cashier, at the hospital ... So when the war broke out, do you remember that? Yes. We were very close to the border, where the rebels entered. There was a time they even kept my father and mother. One of my smaller brothers was killed by the rebels, that was in 1991. They were with the rebels for eight months. After that I never set an eye on them again. I don't know if they are still alive. So after that I tried to join the army as a matter of revenging. I wanted to revenge my people.
What was your first experience with the war? The soldiers came to my village and they were telling that the rebels should come from the east and that they were trying to kill people. So they said that we had to move, and we went to Kenema. Me, my uncle and his family. I had already had been to Kenema, so it was not my first time.
Where did you join the army? I went back to Segbwema. How did you fight? I know the ambush tactics. We have rations and a special belt, and use sign language. We can be in the bush at the ambush point for up to five days.
How did the rebels fight? The rebels are no good at ambush. They are not disciplined. They cannot 'bear' [stand the suffering] ... they more commonly attack according to time. Fourteen-hundred to sixteen-hundred hours is their time. They want to be off, and go with loot. But when the rebels ambush an army 'big man' they know that you must go back for the body, so they use that to trap you. Your town ... Many people mined diamonds, but was it safe? Yes, we had so much security-SSD and at times some special South Africans-protecting the diamond fields. But the time my father was working for the company I was not yet born. But later I accompanied some workmen [diamond diggers]. So when the diamonds came out, they gave me some and then I gave them to my father. So I did some small diamond work. But at present I want to become a nurse.
What was your first experience of the war? I was in school when I heard a gunshot coming from the headquarters, where the soldiers stay. So I heard a gunshot from there and I was really scared. The rebels had already captured the place, so we never turned back. We went to the bush area, to escape to stay alive. We only stayed for a few hours in the bush. So after two days I went back to the town, but the township was [held by] the rebels. I entered the town at around eight-thirty in the evening. The place was so dark. I entered my house and took some of my things away. I went to my father's room and took his clothes, leaving the place at night again. I went back to the bush. Did your father survive the rebel attack? My father managed to escape with my brothers and sisters. I met them at one village, one day after the rebel attack. After that, because my father had not enough to give us food, I left him and joined the scouts, the Boy Scouts. We then took property from people from the town. We took what belonged to them. I was already, before the war, with the Scouts. They gave me a knife, but I was not wearing a uniform, a Scout uniform. I just had the knife. We met one man standing with luggage, containing clothes and other things. We pushed him into the bush and took his luggage. The leader of the Scout boys was called Hamad. He was an older boy. I stayed for five days with the Scouts. Later I went to a checkpoint, the last checkpoint as you enter Kono. So I was sitting there and I saw my elder brother. He was with his lieutenant. He told the official that I was his smaller brother. So then I joined and became a soldier. So later, when the rebels attacked us, they gave me a rifle to fire.
So the moment the rebels attacked they gave you a rifle? I was having a rifle already. I had the weapon when we entered the bush. I was just behind my brother, because he knew how to fight. They taught me how to use the gun. So when the rebels attacked Kabala a message came to our officer that he had to go there. So the next [day] we moved for Kabala. We went with a truck. I was at that time sixteen-plus, that was in 1994. In 1993 I was living a street life, I was not with my father or mother.
How was the first time you had to fight? I was sitting next to the sergeant, down at the checkpoint. We heard some gunshots. I was afraid, so I jumped down into the gutter. And then the soldiers said, 'What are you doing there?' and he laughed. So I came out and took my rifle. So two of my friends who were sitting at the checkpoint answered, 'Just fire where the rebels are.' I was glad that my brother stood behind me, because I didn't know how to fight. The second time I fought was in Kabala, then they shot me here, in my foot.
When you were with the army did you fall into ambushes? Yes. There were ambushes I fell into, in Kono district. That was with Lieutenant K[. . .]. He is still alive, in Gandohun.
How many years did you stay in the army? A year and six months. I liked it in the army because we could do anything we liked to do. When some civilian had something I liked, I just took it without him doing anything to me. We used to rape women. Anything I wanted to do [I did]. I was free.
Did the army pay you? Yes, but I had no official number, so normally the lieutenant made sure that we got something. Sometimes I went to my mother, to buy some rice for her ... a bag of rice.
Were you not afraid to fight? The first time I was really afraid, but later I got used to it and I was not afraid any more. Do you remember the first time you killed somebody? I remember. An officer captured a rebel. He told me to take care of him. He was tied up with his hands on his back. So he was sitting and I had my rifle. But he was talking in a bad way to me. He even insulted my mother. And then I asked him, 'Are you talking to me?' He said, 'Yes.' So I shot him in the stomach and he fell and bled to death. Later, when the lieutenant came back, he took me to the captain, and I had to stay for seven days in a room. Yet he understands the RUF/SL and what it is fighting for with remarkable insight. First he concludes the RUF cadres are, like himself, students or would-be educated youngsters, from the letters they leave behind in the villages they attack, outlining their aims and beliefs, and that their bitterness stems from a corrupt patrimonial system that fails to deliver education and jobs except to a favoured few. Yet he is also aware that the movement's major strategic mistake was to import violent methods of destabilisation from Liberia and target them on the rural poor, instead of directly on the oppressive one-party regime.
He is very impatient with the demobilisation programme, since it has failed to keep its promise of a rapid resumption of his blighted education. His dream of becoming a scientist (mathematics is the key to all science, he tells us), travelling overseas to study, and returning to benefit his village, is becoming more distant with every wasted day, and he delivers himself of some sharp comments about the educated elite who so exploit the system. Were you not afraid? I was not afraid, because what I think is: when I have to die, I die. If God saves me, then I will be saved. Whether you die or live, the rebels were maltreating us. They came and killed our people, they came and stole our properties. So as a man you have to stand for your right and fight for your property, fight for your land.
But were those your own ideas? Yes. Were you able to use a gun? The gun was not heavy. You can take it with one hand.
Was there any training? Yes, there was. The village leader goes for training. Because the skills-the tactics-of the hunters applied when going to kill an animal in the bush are the same tactics we should apply in the field to get rid of the rebels. So you don't need to go for training, because the skill is with you now. The idea to go and kill an animal in the bush is the same idea to go and kill the rebels. Because the animals stay in the bush there, you pick up an idea: you want to kill it. And so also with human beings. Maybe you will go around the people in the bush, examine them in what way you can get rid of the people. Because the Kamajors are very, very wise. The wisdom they use to kill an animal is the same wisdom that they use to attack the rebels. So they are good fighters? Yes, they are very, very good. In fact the enemy has more fear of Kamajors than of government soldiers. Yes, they say that the civil defence used to attack them unexpectedly. Because, the place where you [do] not expect human beings to be, a Kamajo can be possible [in] that place. So when the time reaches for the rebels to share their food, and they think nobody is around, there could be a Kamajo around. And if the Kamajo happens to fire, just a shot-because the bullet we use in this civil defence gun, it is many in the shell-so when you release one shot, that bullet will kill many, many people. The bullets are very, very tiny, but when you shoot, it spreads.
So it can kill three or four people at once? Even more than ten. But what are the big guns, the long ones? You mean the ones the government soldiers use? [RPG?] They use them in combat areas. They use them in clearing an area. But in bush fights with that gun, you would not be able to go. The rebels always like to go in the bush. The Kamajors go and search in the bush and kill them. In the bush you are only able to take a light object with you. You are not able to take a heavy object with you in order to go and fight in the bush. You must take a lighter object in order to do the thing.
Did you also fight the rebels when you were with the Kamajo militia? Yes, at regular times.
And did you also kill somebody? I am not sure if I have killed somebody, because it is group fighting. So maybe you are pointing at one man and your neighbour also [is aiming] at the same man. So after the operation there will be a lot of dead bodies. But you will not be able to identify [which ones you killed] because there were many in the action.
You go out with a group of-say, for instance-ten people? Yes, yes, more than ten, even more than twenty. When you want to capture a large village ... we even go with more than forty. We go there and surround the place. We travel in the bush. We travel a lot and then surround the place. Then the operation takes place.
After a fight what do you do with the dead bodies? We don't have anything to do with them.
You do not bury them? No, we don't bury them, because they are the enemy. They come to spoil our land. They come to disturb our future as well. They even kill our people, so that's why we kill. real, is to leave here in order to go back to Kono ... Yes, I will go ... because if I stay here I will just be at this CAW. It would give me no benefit. We just eat in the morning, in the day and in the evening. But if I can go back to Kono and attend school, because every day you sleep time goes out of you. So that is why I desire now to go back to Kono to [re-]start education. Because God knows it is a long time since I left school. The time I started to go to school I was just age five or six. I thank the Almighty, because I was brilliant in school. But then the war approached. But I said, when this situation is normal I will go back to school. The reason why I took part in the war was because there was no education in our headquarters.
In the future, as you once told me, you want to be a biochemist? So I desire, whether I become a biochemist, or an engineer. Because I want to study pure science, and I might be able to specialise. That is the reason why I always do mathematics, because mathematics is the key of science. the war finishes all these things I mentioned will be fulfilled. If still the war is existing, these things will not be fulfilled. Because after this project will be finished, after two or three years, then I will be relying on the resources of my village. So from my parents, they make some money through their farm, the coffee farm, the cocoa farm. When they harvest they support us with education. But these past years they harvest nothing. But when the war will come to an end they can again support me to get education. So this is my last wish. I pray to the Lord that He brings peace to this country, because people are suffering. People are dying, the poor become homeless, people became fatherless. Yes, I want to stop the war.
6 Child ex-combatant, experience with both the RSLMF and the RUF/SL This sad, inarticulate account by the youngest interviewee in our selection is representative of the experience of child combatants in the war, some of whom [as in this case] have found themselves fighting on both sides of a struggle they are hardly old enough to understand. Only 9 years old when the war started, the interviewee fought as an army irregular and is being demobilised as one, but it appears from his file that his account is selective. Captured by the RUF, he stayed for more than five months with the rebels, and became the leader of a group of 'small boy' rebel fighters. He did not say this in interview because other boys were around, and most were former RSLMF associates. It may be that the attempted amputation of his foot, from which he still suffers, was RUF punishment for trying to run away. Tell me about how you were captured. It was early morning. They came down the road as I was going to work. They pulled me and loaded properties on my head. They threatened to spray me with the gun if I didn't go. We walked day and night, with only snatches of sleep. We made food for them.
Where did you go? We walked for seven days. Any town we reached, we would get food from the people. After eight days we reached the Malal Hills ... on top of the hill.
What happened then? We rested for one day, then they called us to a lecture. They said, 'If we write about bad things in the country nothing will happen, so we have brought you inside the revolution to act to make bad things stop.' They showed us plenty of things that had to happen ... They said there is no freedom, no medical attention, no better roads . . . The system is rotten.
And Did you really want to join them, since the RUF captured you? I saw that what they were saying about the country was true, but I did not really want to join, mainly because of the strain . . . one, the loads we had to carry; two, the walking; three, the hunger ... We did not have good supplies, it was always a problem to get food . . . and we were under rain day and night.
What What will the ones who have really joined want to do if the war ends? What they really want is work. Some will want to learn a trade, like carpentry. Even my own boss will want some as apprentices. But others will want to be in the army.
Will the combatants forget? Will there be tribal war? The RUF people will forget. What has happed has happened. There is no tribalism. It is an armed struggle, but there is no pay. Many would change to national service in the army. Many want the war to end. They pray for it to end, but they do not yet have the chance to escape. Many want education-to go back to school. But they are afraid of the army-that the army will kill them. So they wait, for Foday Sankoh's last orders, to come out and lay down their arms. They are very well disciplined.
What 9 Middle-aged male farmer, abducted by the RUF/SL and used as a labourer In RUF/SL raids the main focus was on abducting young people with some schooling as potential recruits. The remainder of the civilian population were encouraged to flee. At times, however, rebel groups cornered civilian groups by accident. Sometimes the result was a massacre, the rebels being fearful that civilians might otherwise report the whereabouts and route of raiding parties to government troops. But at other times 'unwanted' civilians were drafted as slave labour, particularly to carry loads. The final account in this set comes from an older man who narrowly escaped being burnt alive by the RUF/SL. Drafted as a carrier, he was of little interest to the rebels on account of his age and lack of schooling. Later there was some discussion about whether to train him as a fighter, but his health had deteriorated during forced marches through the bolilands. He escaped in the confusion of a raid that went wrong on the university college campus at Njala. Did you understand anything about why the rebels were fighting? When they trained them they didn't tell them much except that they were fighting for the right to control the country.
Did you ever meet Foday Sankoh? No, never. Did you ever want to join the rebel movement? When I was first ill from the beating I had on the march some said they should kill me, but others said, no, it would be better if they trained me. But the sickness came back and I was not able to fight. So they left me in the camp. That is why I was able to escape, along with two others, when the attack on Njala failed.
NOTES
Only abductees with education were taken for guerrilla training. Other captives were used by the movement as slave labour. last twenty years combatants have become increasingly youthful. Some forces are made up largely of young teenagers; combatants may sometimes be as young as 8 or 10, and girl fighters are increasingly common. The trend to more youthful combatants also reflects the discovery that children-their social support disrupted by war-make brave and loyal fighters; the company of comrades in arms becomes a family substitute. There are two main adult reactions. The first is to stigmatise youth combatants as evil ('bandits', 'vermin'). The other (regularly espoused by agencies working with children) is to see young fighters as victims, as tools of undemocratic military regimes or brutally unscrupulous 'warlords'. But many under-age combatants choose with their eyes open to fight, and defend their choice, sometimes proudly. Set against a background of destroyed families and failed educational systems, militia activity offers young people a chance to make their way in the world. The purpose of this article is to let young combatants explain themselves. The reader is left to decide whether they are the dupes and demons sometimes supposed. RESUME La plupart des guerres impliquent majoritairement des jeunes. Les guerres civiles africaines de ces vingt dernieres annees ont vu l'age des combattants diminuer progressivement. Certaines armees sont composees en grande partie d'adolescents; les combattants n'ont parfois que huit ou dix ans, et la participation des filles au combat s'accroit. La tendance marquee par l'age decroissant des combattants reflete aussi la prise de conscience que les enfants, dont la base de soutien social a ete perturbee par la guerre, se rdevlent etre des combattants courageux et loyaux. Les compagnons d'armes se substituent a la famille. La r6action des adultes est double. La premiere consiste a stigmatiser les jeunes combattants en les diabolisant (en les qualifiant de "bandits" et de "vermine"). L'autre reaction, regulierement adoptee par les organismes de protection de l'enfance, est de considerer les jeunes combattants comme des victimes ou des outils aux mains de regimes militaires antidemocratiques ou de "seigneurs de guerre" brutaux et sans scrupules. De nombreux combattants mineurs choisissent cependant de combattre en pleine connaissance de cause et ddfendent leur choix, parfois avec fiertd. Sur fond de families detruites et de systemes d'education defaillants, l'activisme milicien offre aux jeunes une chance de se faire un chemin dans la vie. Cet article vise a donner la parole aux jeunes combattants. Il s'appuie principalement sur des entretiens mends a Freetown en 1996 avec d'anciens combattants mineurs en cours de rdadaptation (dans deux diffdrents programmes), ainsi que des entretiens recueillis a l'interieur du pays aupres de conscrits du RUF/SL qui se sont eux-memes demobilise rdcemment. Le soin est laisse au lecteur de decider si ces jeunes sont les dupes et les ddmons que l'on suppose parfois.
